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Abstract
Precomputation dramatically reduces the execution latency of many cryptographic algo-
rithms. To sustain the reduced latency over time during which these algorithms are routinely
invoked, however, a pool of precomputation results must be stored and be readily available.
While precomputation is an old and well-known technique, how to securely and yet efficiently
store these precomputation results has largely been ignored. For instance, requiring tamper-
proof memory would be too expensive, if not unrealistic, for precomputation to be cost-effective.
In this paper, we propose an architecture that provides secure storage for cryptographic
precomputation using only insecure memory, which may be eavesdropped or even tampered
with. Specifically, we design a small tamper-resistant hardware module that we call the Queue
Security Proxy (QSP), which situates on the data-path between the processor and the insecure
memory. Our analysis shows that our design is secure, efficient, flexible and yet inexpensive. In
particular, our design’s timing overhead and hardware cost are independent of the storage size.
We also discuss in this paper several interesting extensions to our proposed architecture. We
plan to prototype our design assuming the scenario of precomputing DSA signatures, effectively
building a cost-effective low-latency DSA signing secure coprocessor.
1 Introduction
precomputation is an optimization technique that reduces the execution latency of an algorithm
by performing some of the algorithm’s operations before knowing the input to the algorithm. The
intermediate result produced by precomputation is stored and later used, when the input arrives, to
compute the final output of the algorithm. As one needs only to compute the remaining operations,
or post-computation as we call it, to produce the output upon input arrival, execution latency is
reduced.
Cryptographic precomputation In cryptography, precomputation is an old and well-known
technique. For example, fixed-base modular exponentiation, an operation fundamental to almost all
public-key cryptographic algorithms, can be sped up by precomputing a set of related exponentia-
tions [BGMW92], such as using Shamir’s trick [Gam85] or the sliding window method [YLL94]. As
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another example, it has been well-observed that part of the generation of DSA signatures [NIS00],
as is the case for ElGamal and Schnorr signatures, can be precomputed [BGMW92]. More generally,
all signature schemes converted from a special type of three-move zero-knowledge proof of knowl-
edge protocols [GMR89] known as Σ-protocols using Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS86, BR93]
can benefit from precomputation quite significantly.1 Example include many group signatures and
anonymous credential systems such as [ACJT00, BBS04, CL01, TFS04]. Moreover, precomputing
homomorphic encryption can speed up mix-nets [Cha81], as recently suggested in [AW07].
Reusable v.s. consumable precomputation precomputation can be reusable, i.e., a single
precomputation can be reused across multiple algorithm executions, or consumable, i.e., a new
precomputation is needed per execution. Speeding up modular exponentiation using the sliding
window method is an example of reusable precomputation—any modular exponentiation with the
same base can be sped up by one-time precomputing a set of values for that base. On the other hand,
exponentiating a random element in DSA signature signing is a consumable precomputation—the
element must be randomly drawn for every signature to be signed. Consumable precomputation
poses a bigger challenge than reusable precomputation does when it comes to efficiently securing
it against hardware attacks, for two reasons. First, confidentiality of the precomputed results
is usually necessary in the former but not the latter. Second, the required storage space in the
former grows with the expected rate of an algorithm being executed, whereas that in the latter
is a constant. In this paper, we are going to overcome the bigger challenge—secure consumable
precomputation—and refer to it as precomputation for simplicity’s sake in the rest of the paper.
Sustaining the low latency through buffering Precomputation is capable of reducing latency
of an algorithm execution only when a precomputed result is available upon an input’s arrival. In
situations when an algorithm is constantly being executed over time, computing and storing a
single precomputation result would not sustain a low latency throughout the executions. One must
therefore buffer precomputation results, i.e. precompute those results in advance and store in such
a way that they are readily available when needed. So long as the pool is not empty, low latency can
be sustained. In fact, buffering has long been in prevalent use in various fields such as networking,
in which buffering helps accommodating the jitter and burstiness of traffic, and architecture, in
which instructions and/or data are prefetched and cached to reduce latency.
The need for a secure storage The majority of cryptographic algorithms are designed and
constructed without anticipating any precomputation, and thus have their security only proven
assuming no precomputation. It is therefore of paramount importance, when applying precompu-
tation to a cryptographic algorithm, to make sure that no security guarantee is violated. To this
end, the safest approach when handling the precomputation results is to treat them as internal
states of the entity executing the algorithm, thereby effectively assuming them to be unobservable
and unmodifiable by anyone else. The failing of such an assumption to hold could have devastating
consequences. For example, in the case of precomputing DSA signatures, allowing an adversary to
eavesdrop, overwrite, or replay only one precomputation result would be enough to leak the private
signing key.
1In these schemes, most of the heavyweight operations, namely group exponentiation, can be precomputed.
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The challenge Unfortunately, As the size of the storage of multiple precomputation results is
significantly larger than the size of the internal states needed to be maintained for a single execution
instance, it is unrealistic to assume that the whole storage would fit it a tamper-resistant module
such as a hardened CPU. Tamper-proving the memory would also be too expensive and would put
a upper limit on the size of the memory due to physical constraints. In this paper, we are going to
overcome this challenge.
1.1 Our Contributions
We make the following contributions in this paper:
– We motivate that, in order to sustain the benefits of reducing latency of cryptographic algo-
rithm execution brought by precomputation, one needs to maintain the storage of a pool of
readily available precomputation results; and that the security of such storage is critical to
the security of the cryptographic algorithm.
– We design an architecture that turns untrusted memory into a memory that is secure for
storing precomputation results. The architecture is very efficient and has a cost independent
of the size of the memory. Our analysis shows the architecture we propose is secure.
– We discuss prototyping our architecture assuming the scenario of precomputing DSA sig-
natures, effectively resulting in an coprocessor architecture for low-latency DSA signature
signing with high security assurance and yet low cost. We speculate performance figures.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some background on
hardware-based security and also review the cryptographic tools needed by our architecture. In
Section 3, we describe our approach to overcome the challenge by giving an overview of our archi-
tectural design and explaining some of the design choices. In Section 4, we present our architectural
construction in details, together with an analysis on its security and efficiency. In the same section,
we also formalize the security requirements and the threat model under which these requirements
must be met. In Section 5, we discuss several research directions that are worth exploring. We
conclude the paper in Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Hardware-Based Security
Designing hardware-based security mechanisms into the computing architecture is important as
software security solutions are incapable of defending against hardware attacks and many software
attacks. There are mechanisms that provide security against physically tampering through means
such as tamper-resistance, tamper-evidence, tamper-response. Deploying a hardware-based security
mechanism could be very expensive, and different trade-offs between security and cost can lead to
radically different paradigms.
The IBM 4756/4764 approach The IBM 4758 cryptographic coprocessor [SW99, DLP+01] is a
secure crypto processor implemented on a programmable PCI board, on which components such as
a microprocessor, memory, and a random number generator are housed within a tamper-responding
3
environment. They are general-purpose x86 computers with a very high security assurance against
physical attacks. While they find applications in the commerce sector such as securing the ATMs
of banks, their high costs forbid most end-users benefit from them.
The hardened-CPU approach A more realistic approach to secure general-purpose computers
such as today’s PCs against software and even certain hardware attacks is by assuming that only
CPUs are hardened. Lie et al.’s eXecute-Only Memory (XOM) [LTM+00] architecture pioneered
this line of research but is vulnerable to replay attacks. Suh et al. later proposed AEGIS [SCG+03a],
which is immune to replay attacks and uses techniques such as Merkle-trees [Mer80] for better
efficiency. The use of Counter mode for AES operations was proposed [SCG+03b, YZG03] to reduce
memory-write latencies. Prediction techniques are used in [RSP05, SLG+05] hide the memory-
read latencies. Other advances include using on-chip caches [GSC+03] and incremental multi-set
hashes [CDvD+03] to reduce latency incurred by memory integrity checking.
The architecture we are going to propose in this paper falls under this category of hardware-
based security as it has the same trust assumptions on both the processor and the memory. Our
architecture deals only with precomputation rather than arbitrary software. We note that although
architectures like AEGIS can provide the same functionality as ours, ours is simpler and more
efficient due to the exploitation of properties of precomputation. In fact, while AEGIS aims to
providing a secure execution environment for general-purpose computers such as x86 PCs, we gear
our architecture towards coprocessor for embedded devices.
The TCG’s TPM approach The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is a consortium that works
towards increasing the security of standard commodity platforms. The group proposed a specifica-
tion of an inexpensive micro-controller chip called the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [TPM06].
In the last few years, major vendors of computer systems have been shipping machines that have
included TPMs, with associated BIOS support. A TPM, when mounted on the motherboard of
a commodity computing device such as a PC, provides internal storage space for storing, e.g.,
cryptographic keys, cryptographic functions for encryption/decryption, signing/verifying, as well
as hardware-based random number generation. TPMs act as a hardware-based root of trust and
can be used to attest the initial configuration of the underlying computing platform (“attestation”),
as well as to seal and bind data to a specific platform configuration (“unsealing” or “unwrapping”).
The aspiration is that if the adversary compromises neither the TPM nor the BIOS, then the
TPM’s promises of trusted computing will be achieved. The reality is murkier: attacks on the OS
can still subvert protections; recent work (e.g., [Ber07]) is starting to demonstrate some external
hardware integration flaws; and the long history of low-cost physical attacks on low-cost devices
(e.g., [AK96]) hasn’t caught up with the TPM yet.
2.2 Cryptographic Tools
There are various symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic techniques that provide security no-
tions such has confidentiality, authentication, integrity, etc. For example, the Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard [NIS01], or AES, is a block cipher that provides confidentiality of data, whereas
HMAC [NIS02], is a keyed-hash message authentication that provides both message authentication
and integrity. Here we review a fairly recent symmetric cryptographic tool called authenticated
encryption, which effectively combines the functionality of AES and HMAC. As we will see, our
architecture requires the use of it.
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Authenticated encryption The Advanced Encryption Standard, or AES, specifies a block cipher
that operates on blocks of 128-bit data. There are several modes of operation to choose from when
encrypting messages of arbitrary length using AES, such as the Electronic CodeBook (ECB) mode
, the Cipher-Block Chaining (CBC) mode and the Counter (CTR) mode. Different modes have
different properties. For instance, decryption is faster than encryption under the CBC mode, which
is preferable when decryption is on the critical path. The CTR mode can potentially further reduce
both encryption and decryption latency by taking the AES operations away from the critical path.
The modes mentioned above provides data confidentiality but no data integrity. There are
modes of operation, e.g. IACBC, IAPM, OCB, EAX, CWC, CCM and GCM, that provide both.
When operating under these modes, AES effectively becomes authenticated encryption rather than
just encryption. Among these modes, the CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC) mode and the GCM
(Galois/Counter Mode) mode are particularly extractive because authentication is done without
feedback of data-blocks. This means that both authentication and encryption can be parallelized
to achieve extremely high throughput. We will use AES under GCM mode in our architecture.
AES-GCM AES-GCM has two operations, authenticated encryption AES-GCM.Enc and authen-
ticated decryption AES-GCM.Dec. AES-GCM.Enc takes four inputs: (1) a secret key K, whose
length is appropriate for the underlying AES; (2) an initialization vector IV that can have any
number of bits between 1 and 264; (3) a plaintext P , which can have any number of bits between
0 and 239 − 256; and (4) an additional authenticated data (AAD) A, which can have any number
of bits between 0 and 264. AES-GCM.Enc outputs (1) a ciphertext C whose length is the same as
that of P and (2) an authentication tag T , whose length can be any value between 64 and 128.
AES-GCM.Dec takes five inputs: K, IV , C, A and T . It outputs either P or a special symbol
Failure that indicates failure, i.e. the inputs are not authentic.
We refer the readers to [MV04b, MV04a] for the details regarding the specification, performance
and security of AES-GCM.
3 Our Approach
We now return to the challenge we discussed in Section 1: how to cost-effectively provide a secure
storage for cryptographic precomputation so that it can provide a sustainable benefit without
breaking the security. We introduce in this section our approach to overcome such a challenge.
3.1 Memory Security Proxy
Since using tamper-proof memory would not meet our design goal of cost-effectiveness, in our
solution insecure memory will be used. To account for the fact that insecure memory can be
eavesdropped and tampered with, we augment its use with security measures enforced by a small
tamper-proof hardware module through cryptographic techniques. We call such a module the
Memory Security Proxy (MSP). The MSP must be both space- and computationally efficient: its
size (e.g., in terms of gate-count) and the timing overhead it incurs should grow as slowly as possible
with the size of the insecure memory it is securing, or even better, be constants independent of the
size.
In our architecture, the MSP situates between the processor, which executes (the precomputa-
tion and post-computation of) the cryptographic algorithm, and the insecure memory. The MSP
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effectively turns the insecure memory into a secure one by instrumenting the processor’s read and
write accesses. This most probably means that the MSP will incur timing overhead on these ac-
cesses, but it is otherwise transparent to the processor. In other words, the processor is oblivious to
whether it is accessing insecure memory without protection whatsoever, memory secured through
hardware tamper-proof mechanisms, or our MSP. This is an attractive property, as it simplifies
designs and allows for better interoperability and upgradability.
In a threat model where adversary is physically present and capable of launching hardware
attacks against the computing devices, the processor that execute the cryptographic operations,
possible among many other components, must be trusted to behave securely regardless of those
attacks. Similarly, we rely on the MSP to be as trustworthy as the main processor. This is a
realistic assumption because any design of such module is going to have a very small physical size,
most likely just a small fraction of the size of the processor. Figure 1 depicts an architectural model










subject to physical attacks 
Trusted Zone,
tamper-proof 
Figure 1: The architectural model
We remark that this model is not a new one. Rather, all architectures we reviewed in Section 2
that take the hardened-CPU approach follow this model. However, all of them focus on securing
general-purpose computers such as PCs, in which the insecure memory being protected is randomly-
accessible. It has been proven in these works that it is very difficult to efficiently secure insecure
RAM. As we will show next, we can exploit the properties of cryptographic precomputation to
avoid some of the difficulties and thus achieve better results.
3.2 Data-Structure for precomputation Storage
The application of precomputation to a cryptographic algorithm turns the algorithm’s execution
into a process that follows the producer-consumer model. Under such a model, the producer pro-
duces, through precomputation, the goods (i.e., the precomputation results) that are later con-
sumed by the consumer, through post-computation, upon the arrival of algorithmic inputs. The
asynchronous communication channel between the producer and the consumer may be implemented
using data-structures such as stacks, First-In-First-Out (FIFO) queues (a.k.a. pipes), register ar-
rays (a.k.a. Random Access Memory, or RAM) and etc., depending on the desired order of the
goods being consumed (relative to them being produced).
We make the observation that using the precomputation results in the same order of their
production always yields a correct execution of the cryptographic algorithms. In fact, in most cases
the precomputation results are statistically uncorrelated to one another, and one may thus even
use them in arbitrary order. Computing the commitment of a random value in the precomputation
of DSA signatures is one example. Consequently, data-structures such as RAM and FIFO queues
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and RAM are legitimate for storing cryptographic precomputation results. In our design to be
presented in the next section, we use FIFO queues rather than RAM because of the following two
reasons.
– Securing insecure RAM efficiently has been proved to be difficult. On the contrary, as we will
see, our securing insecure FIFO queues is very efficient.
– Insecure FIFO queues can be efficiently implemented using insecure RAM (in both software
and hardware) but not the other way round. Our architecture requires only the “weaker”
insecure FIFO queues.
From now on, we abbreviate FIFO queues as queues. Also, we call the Memory Security Proxy
we are going to build, which is specialized for protecting queues, the Queue Security Proxy (QSP).
We end this section with some formalism of queues, which is necessary to formally reason about
the correctness and security of our design.
Queues A queue is a data-structure that implements a First-In, First-Out (FIFO) policy by
supporting two operations, namely Enqueue and Dequeue, which inserts and deletes elements from
the data-structure respectively. More rigorously, such a policy can be specified using the axiomatic
approach of Larch [GH93], in which an object’s sequential history is summarized by a value, which
(informally speaking) reflects the object’s state at the end of the history. These values are used in
axioms giving the pre- and post-conditions on the objects operations. A queue implementation is
said to be correct if the above policy is satisfied. For simplicity’s sake, we also use the following
verbal definition of correctness: A queue is correct if the i-th item dequeued has the same value as
the i-th item enqueued. Note that correctness is defined assuming the absence of an adversary. In
order to define the security of a queue implementation, we will need to decide on a threat model
and specify how the implementation behaves under such a model. We leave this to the next section.
4 Our QSP Design
In this section, we first define the security requirements of the QSP and the threat model under
which these requirements must be met. We then present our QSP design, first in the form of
software pseudo-code to facilitate understanding and reasoning, then in the form of a hardware
architectural design. We then analyze our architecture.
4.1 Security Model
To attack the security of the QSP, a computationally bounded but physically present adversary may
launch physical attacks on the untrusted zone of the architecture, as illustrated in Figure 1. Such
an adversary may also probe the input-output relationship of the QSP as follows: an adversary
may arbitrarily and adaptively ask the processor to enqueue or dequeue precomputation results
and ask the processor to reveal a particular precomputation result. Note that in real world a
precomputation result is never directly revealed to anybody but is rather used to influence the
final outcome of the cryptographic algorithm. We give such a capability to the adversary so that
we don’t have to worry about the algorithm in question and whether it is secure or not. Such a
modeling provides a confidentiality guarantee at least as strong as needed.
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We regard a QSP design as secure if it has correctness, confidentiality and integrity, defined as
follows.
Correctness Any QSP design must be correct: if the underlying queue a QSP is protecting is
correct, then the QSP behaves correctly as a queue in the absence of an adversary.
Confidentiality We hinted earlier that the safest strategy to take when securing precomputation
storage is to assume the entire precomputation result to be as private as any algorithmic internal
states. Nonetheless, part of the precomputation result can be made public without security breaches
in certain scenarios when that part will eventually appear in the final algorithmic output, and its
release a prior to the arrival of the input does not lead to security breaches. DSA signature signing
precomputation results are of the form (k−1, r), knowing r, which will eventually be a part of the
output signature, is fine, whereas knowing the whole result would leak to universal forgeability.
Not having to encrypt the whole result may lead to better efficiency.
Now we define confidentiality. A precomputation result to be enqueued is called a data object,
or simply data D, which is a pair (A,P ), where A contains data that doesn’t require confidentiality
and P is the plaintext to be encrypted by the QSP. A QSP design has confidentiality if no adversary,
whose capabilities are as described above, can learn any information about P in any D that the
adversary hasn’t asked the processor to reveal.
Integrity Roughly speaking, a QSP with integrity is one that either behaves correctly upon
access, or signals an error when having been tampered with. Note that this definition of integrity
implies both data authenticity and data freshness of the queue the QSP is protecting. Specifically,
if an adversary can modified a precomputation result, say the i-th one enqueued, without the QSP
being able to detect it, then the QSP would not be correct as what is dequeued at the i-th time is
different from what was enqueued at the i-th time. Similarly, an adversary replaying an old result
leads to the same violation of integrity.
More formally, an adversary is successful in attacking the integrity of a QSP when there exists
an i such that the precomputation results enqueued at the i-th differs from what is dequeued at
the i-th time. A QSP design has integrity if no computationally bounded and physically present
adversary can succeed with non-negligible probability.
4.2 The Construction
The idea The use of authenticated encryption makes our design of a QSP very simple. pre-
computation results (Data in) generated by the processor are fed to the QSP in which the results
are encrypted using AES-GCM. The initialization vector (IV out) increments per encryption. This
serves two purposes. First, for AES-GCM to be secure, the IV should never be reused under the
same key. Second, the IV serves as a counter that gives a sequential and consecutive ordering to
the precomputation results being operated on, and is thus able to circumvent replay attacks. The
output of the AES-GCM encryption (Sec data out) can then be enqueued into an insecure queue.
When the QSP is being dequeued, it in turns dequeue an entry from the insecure queue, and
decrypt that entry using AES-GCM decryption. Again, the initialization vector (IV in) increments
per decryption. As long as the two IVs are set to the same value, e.g. zero, during start-up before
any enqueue or dequeue operations, the precomputation result encrypted with an IV value will
eventually be decrypted with the same IV value.
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System parameters We provide some more details on various parameters. The key may remain
constant throughout the lifetime of the QSP, or be picked uniformly at random from its space
during boot-time. Note that using a new key effectively means all the old precomputation results
are flushed. The two IVs are set to zero during start-up. We choose AES-128 for AES-GCM. This
means a key size of 128-bit. The size of the IVs has to be such that the IVs never overflow. We
use 80-bit IVs. Finally we select 96-bit as the size of the Tag.
Software construction Without loss of generality, we assume the underlying insecure queue
provides an interface for querying whether it is full or not, and empty or not. Algorithms 1 and 2
show the software implementation of the enqueue and dequeue operations performed by the QSP
respectively.
Algorithm 1 QSP.Enqueue(Datain)
Private Input: K, IVout
1: if Q.isFull() then
2: return Error
3: end if
4: 〈Pin, Ain〉 := Datain
5: 〈Cout, Tout〉 ← AES-GCM.Enc(K, IVout, Pin, Ain)
6: IVout ← IVout + 1
7: Sec Dataout := 〈Ain, Cout, Tout〉
8: Q.enqueue(Sec Dataout)
Algorithm 2 QSP.Dequeue()
Private Input: K, IVin
1: if Q.isEmpty() then
2: return Error
3: end if
4: Sec Datain ← Q.dequeue()
5: 〈Aout, Cin, Tin〉 := Sec Datain
6: res← AES-GCM.Dec(K, IVin, Cin, Aout, Tin)
7: if res=failure then
8: return Error
9: else
10: Pout := res
11: Dataout := 〈Pout, Aout〉
12: return Dataout
13: end if
Hardware construction Figure 2 shows the architectural design of the QSP, with the control
signals omitted for clarity. Data in and Dataout are the data-bus connected to the processor,
Sec Datain and Sec Dataout are the data-bus connected to the insecure queue. We have assumed
that the underlying hardware queue memory is asynchronous, so that the enqueue and dequeue
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operations can be done asynchronously. It is straightforward to modify the design if synchronous
queue is used instead.
The fact that the authenticated encryption of a precomputation result is bigger in size than
the result itself has the following implications. One may assume a wider data-bus for Sec Data
(both in and out) than that for Data (both in and out). However, this might not be favorable if
the transparency of the QSP is critical, such as in situations where the architecture is difficult to
change and adding the QSP as a “mod-chip” is the only viable solution. Another possibility is to
assume that precomputation results do not use up the whole bus-width and that they still fit in the
bus after the expansion due to authenticated encryption. This may require changes to the software
that does the cryptographic algorithm, which could be too inconvenient to be feasible in some cases.
Our recommended approach is to have the QSP split up every incoming precomputation result into
two halves2 and operate on each half as if it was a single incoming precomputation result. Similarly,
when being dequeued, the QSP would in turn dequeue the insecure queue twice and combine them
into a single answer. It is easy to easy that if the QSP is secure without this splitting mechanism,




















Figure 2: The architectural design of our QSP
4.3 Analysis
Security Correctness of our QSP design is a straightforward consequence of the correctness of
the internal AES-GCM. Similarly, it is trivial to see that as long as the internal AES-GCM is secure
in terms of confidentiality, our QSP design has confidentiality. Our QSP design has also integrity
2Splitting into halves works as long as a precomputation result has its bit-length greater than the bit-length of
the tag, which is virtually always the case given that we picked the bit-length of the tag to be 96.
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because of the following. Assume the contrary that our QSP has no integrity, then there exists an
adversary whose capabilities are as described in Section 4.1 such that he, during an attack, was
successful in causing the QSP to return a precomputation result D′ at the i-th dequeue for some i,
where D is different from the precomputation result D given to the QSP during the i-th enqueue.
If i is not unique, let i be the minimum value. Now since AES-GCM decryption did not return
failure during that particular dequeue of QSP, the security of AES-GCM implies that D = D′,
which contradicts to D 6= D′. Therefore our QSP has integrity.
Efficiency Let n be the maximum number of precomputation results the insecure memory is
expected to store. Let the bit-length of the key K, the IVs IVin and IVout, the plaintext P , the
additional authenticated data A and the tag T be `K , `IV , `P , `A and `T respectively. Thus the
bit-length of a precomputation result `D is `A +`P . Note that the length of the ciphertext C equals
that of P .
Now our QSP has a storage overhead of `T`D . Recall that we picked `T = 96 and this is inde-
pendent of `D. In case of DSA precomputation, `D = 320 and thus the overhead is 30%. Space
overhead is generally not a problem as insecure memory is cheap. Moreover, the figure would be
a lot smaller for many group signatures, as they can easily have precomputation results comprised
of 10 or so 160-bit elements.
The latency incurred by the QSP during an enqueue operation is precisely the time AES-GCM
encryption takes to encrypt `D. As discussed, we chose AES-GCM as the authenticated encryption
mechanism because of its extremely low latency made possible by parallelizing the encryption and
authentication so that the latency is independent of `D. Of course, this implies to enjoy this
minimal latency the gate-count of the QSP grows linearly with `D. But again as the processor is
trusted to be enable to store more or less the same amount of data anyways, this is not an issue.
The actual speed and latency attained by the AES-GCM encryption and decryption depends on
its implementation and the hardware it is running on. Some performance figures can be found
in [MV04a, Sat07]. For example, Satoh [Sat07] has an implementation that achieves 102 Gbps
throughout with 979 Kgates using 0.13-µm CMOS standard cell library.
The latency incurred by the QSP during a dequeue operation can be argued similarly. However
we highlight one point in the following. Enqueue latency is usually not a concern as the operation is
not on the critical path of the algorithmic execution, just like the precomputation itself. Therefore,
one might not even care about speeding up QSP’s enqueue operation. For example, in case of
a hardware implementation, one could save cost by using less parallelization, at the expense of
slower enqueuing. Nonetheless, this is not the case for the dequeue operation as it is indeed on the
critical path. In the pursuit of faster dequeuing, we suggest a slight change to QSP’s architecture to
pre-fetch and pre-decrypt the next precomputation result stored in the insecure queue. This way,
an extra of `D-bit trusted register in the QSP is needed but precomputation results become readily
available to be dequeued at the QSP when the processor wants them. Hence, our QSP provides all
its security guarantees at no cost in terms of dequeue latency.
5 Discussion
MSPs for other data-structures In this paper, we focus on building a Memory Security Proxy
for FIFO queues as they fit naturally for cryptographic precomputation. Plenty of work by others
have looked at ways of securing RAM for general-purpose computing. It would be interesting to
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build MSPs for other data-structures such as stacks, priority queues, sets, dictionaries, and etc,
and find out some potential applications. For instance, Devanbu et al. suggested in [DS02] that
resource-limited devices such as smart-cards and set-top boxes may offload implementations of
data-structures on to hostile platforms. The authors actually proposed ways to secure stacks and
queues, but only limited to protecting their integrity (i.e., no confidentiality).
Generalizing the producer-consumer model In our architecture, we assume that the pro-
ducer and the consumer are the same entity. Alternatively, they can be two separated entities such
that there is no communication channel between them except the insecure queue through which
precomputation results are piped. The ability of allowing dynamic pairing between the producers
and the consumers may be useful.
More interestingly, there can be an asymmetry between the number of producers and consumers,
e.g. multiple consumers are coupled with only one producer, who is trusted by the consumers. Let
us elaborate on this by considering a pervasive computing scenario where entities are equipped
with small devices exchanging information with devices possessed by other entities, such as people
carrying electronic gadgets, cars installed with sensors and electrical appliances within households.
These devices sign DSA signatures on their outgoing messages for security reasons and therefore
each of them requires a DSA signing engine. However, if the person (or the car, or the house)
has a single trusted DSA precomputation module, then all the devices need only to do the post-
computation. Since the circuitry for doing DSA precomputation is more complicated than that
for doing post-computation, every device saves more than 50% in terms hardware costs needed for
signing.
A low-cost DSA signing secure coprocessor As our next step, we plan to implement our QSP
assuming the scenario of providing secure storage for DSA precomputation, effectively building a
cost-effective low-latency DSA signature signing secure coprocessor. We expect such a coprocessor
can benefit the information security of communication in critical infrastructures, especially those
that impose stringent timing requirements on tolerable latency of message delivery such as the
power grid.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have motivated the need for a secure storage in order for cryptographic precom-
putation to provide sustainable benefits. Our solution to the challenge is a small tamper-resistant
module called Queue Security Proxy. We have formalized a threat model for cryptographic precom-
putation and demonstrated how the QSP can guarantee the necessary security despite hardware
attacks. As our analysis has shown, our proposed design of the QSP is very efficient. This work
has also inspired several interesting directions for further research.
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